This paper aims to discuss the issue of the judicial protection of human rights in post-conflict
Introduction
"The greatest value of human life is best represented in the recognition of fundamental rights, and in fully enabling people to enjoy and exercise these rights to the extent that preserves their humanity and respects their civility. (…).The rights of individuals would be without value if no legal system were able to play an active role in their protection".
Fahed Abul-Ethem 2

I. Background
This section provides a brief background and the general information necessary for the best understanding of the issue under analysis, by situating the problem in its context. The background starts with a short presentation of Burundi's violent past (1). While, for the purpose of addressing the current issue, the paper assumes that Burundi is a post-conflict country, it nevertheless questions the relevance of this characterization (2), particularly given the magnitude and consequences of the political and humanitarian crisis that erupted in 2015, after the incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza was nominated by his ruling Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) 9 party to run for a controversial third term in office.
Burundi's violent past
Burundi, is a small (27,834 sq km), overpopulated (ca. 12 million) 10 Micombero who later proclaimed the country a republic, abolishing the monarchy 11 . In the decades that followed its independence, Burundi shifted into ethno-political based cycles of violence, which resulted in large-scale human rights violations (1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1991, (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) 2015) . In this dynamic of violence, 1972 12 and 1993 13 are remembered as particularly bloody years, with some sources suggesting a "genocidal" character to the 9 National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy. 10 Burundi is one of the most densely populated country in Africa, with 421.9 people per square kilometer (June 2017). 11 Bulletin Officiel du Burundi (Official Gazette of Burundi)., 1967, 1; Bellon Remi and Delfosse, Pierre, Codes et Lois du Burundi, 1970, 7. 12 In 1972, following a Hutu rebel attack in the southern and western part of Burundi, where thousands of members of the Tutsi minority members were massacred, disproportionate government reprisals resulted in mass killings where thousands of Hutu lost their lives, with most of victims belonging to the more educated and socially prominent representatives of the group. See inter alia, Chrétien, J.-P., Du Pasquier, J.-Fr.. (2007), E.-Eggers/ W. Weinstein, (1997) 13 In 1993, the assassination of the Burundi's first democratically elected President, Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu) by members of the then Tutsi-dominated military, was followed by ethno-political violence during which more than 300,000 lives are reported to have been lost ( On the meaning of the terms 'hutu' and 'tutsi', see note 15. the holding of democratic elections at different levels ("colline" or hill, neighbourhood, commune and national). The former rebel movement, the CNDD-FDD, was transformed into a political party, which overwhelmingly won the elections and became the ruling party.
14 Chrétien, J.-P., Du Pasquier, J. Given that the political context is so fluid and peace so fragile, any assumption of a stable postconflict order permitting a consistent reform of the justice system may be premature. As far as judicial protection of human rights is concerned, it is worth noting that Burundi has one of the most progressive legal system in Africa, and perhaps in the world. However, the major challenge of effective protection of human rights, including judicial protection, is far from being a matter of an inappropriate legal framework. Of course, with respect to thejudicial-protection of human rights, as well as other related issues, Burundi's legal framework is far from perfect. Some insufficiencies and inconsistencies do exist. This paper argues however that the existing legal framework has significant potential, but it requires the full and fair implementation by an impartial and independent judiciary, by judges with sufficient professional qualifications and resistance to corruption, in order to enhance effective protection and redress for victims of human rights violations.
II. Burundi's Human Rights Legal
From a strict normative point of view, Burundi has an impressive human rights framework.
Interestingly, human rights have been constitutionalized and major human rights treaties ratified. So far as the constitutionalisation of human rights is concerned, not only does Burundi's Constitution reserve a chapter for individuals' and citizen's fundamental rights, 37 but also the list of human rights with a constitutional status is lengthened by the constitutionalisation of international human rights proclaimed and guaranteed by relevant international human rights instruments. 38 Both of these two aspects of constitutionalisation are 40 Traditionally, the problem of the incorporation of international law into a domestic legal order relies on two theories: monism and dualism. Nigel Foster made an interesting synthesis of the two theories. According to this author, "Monism basically assumes that international law and national law form part of a single system of laws; therefore the acceptance of international law would not require formal incorporation by legislative transformation, but after treaty agreement and assent or ratification, (…) it would be directly applicable within the state". Burundi is an example of a monist state. "Dualism; on the other hand, regards international law and national law as fundamentally different systems of law that exist alongside each other. In order to overcome the barrier existing between the two systems, legislation is required to transform rules of international laws into the national legal system before it can have any binding effect within the state in such circumstances. Except for this legal loophole, which is likely to darken Burundi's legal framework with respect to protection and redress for victims of human rights violations and abuses, one may argue, on the basis of the abovementioned arguments on the status of human rights in the domestic legal system, that Burundi's legal framework has an excellent foundation which an independent, professional and not under-funded judiciary can rely on, to hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for their acts, and to provide adequate redress to victims of these violations. However, the law's promises with respect to the judicial protection of human rights, are considerably limited by many challenges usually extending beyond the legal sphere. The following section discusses the most prominent of these challenges.
III. Challenges to judicial protection of human rights in post-conflict Burundi
It is well known that a strong, trustworthy, independent, impartial and competent judiciary established by law, is a cornerstone of the domestic mechanisms for the protection of human rights in any modern democracy. In the case of Burundi, the judicial mechanism faces many challenges with respect to effective protection of human rights. From my own assessment, the major challenges are the following: limits to or a lack of independence (1), failure of adherence to or weakness of rule of law (2) and an extreme passivity on the part of judges in applying domesticated international human rights law provisions (3).
Inadequate judicial independence
"The executive branch's ascendancy over the judicial branch is also apparent in the appointment of judges and the fact that they may be transferred, which runs counter to the principle of the irremovability of judges. The Ministry of Justice controls the promotion of judges and may propose their suspension or dismissal"
Commission of Inquiry on Burundi 46
One of the biggest and most chronic challenges to access to justice in Burundi, repeatedly Despite the existence of a legal framework proclaiming independence of the judiciary at the highest normative level, the same framework is weakened by gaps and inconsistencies and incoherence with regards to guarantee of genuine independence of the judiciary, particularly from the executive branch of government. In practice, with the judge's career depending on the prince's favour, 60 which is entirely in the hands of executive authorities, and a Superior Council of Magistracy legally vested with the mission of ensuring a proper functioning of justice as well as the independence of judges, 61 but actually dominated by the executive, 62 political intrusion into the functioning of the judiciary is inevitable, in spite of the courage and integrity of judges.
Threats to "rebellious" judges are not limited to their career but extend in some "sensitive"
cases to threats to their lives. Whereas according to Burundi's laws, -including the Constitution-judicial power is vested in the judiciary, 77 such that "the judiciary shall be impartial and independent from the legislative and the executive branches of the government" 78 and "judges shall be subject only to the Constitution and the law", 79 in practice, during the exercise of their constitutional duties, Burundi's judges sometimes face embarrassing normative challenge. When it comes to the socalled -politically-"sensitive files" or "sensitive cases" (dossiers sensibles), the rulers' law takes its revenge on the rule of law. The expressions "sensitive cases", "sensitive issues" or "sensitive files" encompass a broad range of judicial proceedings, mostly criminal proceedings, threat to the rule of law, to equal and effective access to justice and to judicial protection of human rights that corruption represents in Burundi.
Last but not least, as far as the question of rule of law with respect to judicial protection of human rights is concerned, while it is recognized that in a state governed by the rule of law, the administration is neither entitled to exercise the judicial power legally vested in courts, 91 nor allowed to substitute its own decisions for court judgments nor to obstruct the enforcement of those judgments anyway; nonetheless, a review of the -legal-literature reveals cases of undue interference from public administrators undermining the enforcement of courts decisions. respect to inheritance. Thus far, in inheritance-related litigation, Burundi's courts continue to issue judgements which deny women land rights on the grounds of both contested "customary laws" and in contradiction to the Constitution and international human rights instruments where women's rights, including the equality of rights between men and women, are directly incorporated into and made an integral part of national law. 96 Litigants may argue, in demanding the application of provisions of international human rights instruments, that the said provisions are an integral part of Burundi's Constitution and that they have been transformed into national law. Judges, however, -except the Constitutional Court-will rarely agree to discuss arguments based on these provisions or to refer to or rely on them in their judgments.
This tendency of the courts to summarily dismiss arguments based on international human rights law and their reluctance to find violations of this law are rather a consequence of lack of familiarity with the rules of the game with respect to direct applicability and incorporation of treaties in the domestic legal order than judicial unwillingness to enforce constitutional rights. Siniša Rodin and Tamara Perišin listed reasons for the rare application of international human rights in the case of Germany, points which are more relevant with regard to Burundi's judges: "1. International human rights norms are not part of the core curricula in the legal education and practical training of lawyers and judges.
2. Some courts may have difficulties in obtaining (…) translation.
3. Access to texts of international norms sometimes proves to be difficult." For those with libraries, these latter are often poorly equipped. Last but not least, a great majority of judges and court staff do not have access to the internet. All of these challenges limit development by Burundi's courts of a creative and robust human rights jurisprudence.
